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Due Process Clause requires some "minimal requirements"
in clemency proceedings.'5 Thus, five of the nine justices
agreed that Due Process does require some minimal
procedural safeguards in clemency proceedings.
ANAIYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Because the Court did not define what clemency proce-
dures would satisfy Due Process, the application of the decision
toVirginia is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
majority of the Court found the Ohio clemency procedures suf-
ficient. It is equally clear that in some important respects, the
procedure in Vrginia provides far fewer protections.Thus, capi-
tal counsel may argue that theVirginia procedure is insufficient.
Specifically, Virginia's clemency procedures differ from
Ohio's in two important respects.' 6 First, the Virginia Parole
Board ("VPB") is not required to conduct a clemency investi-
gation in every case." Rather, it is only required to do so"at the
request of the Governor.""8 VPB may, however, conduct a
clemency investigation on its own initiative in any other case
in which it is "proper or in the best interest of the
Commonwealth" to do so.'" Counsel may be able to argue that
a discretionary clemency investigation is insufficient to satisfy
the minimum requirements of due process. Such unfettered
151d. at *11 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens concluded that the case should be
remanded to the District Court to consider whether Ohio's pro-
cedures meet the minimum standards of Due Process.
'6See Va. Const. art. 5, §12 &Va. Code §§ 53.1-229 to 53.1-231
(1994).
'WA. CODE § 53.1-231 (1994).
1id.
19Id.
'In Woodar4 Justice O'Connor stated that"[jludicial intervention
might... be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state official
flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case
where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency
discretion could lead to grants of clemency which are based
on some constitutionally impermissible factor or procedure.2"
Second,Virginia's clemency procedures do not guarantee
an inmate any notice or hearing. Notice and an opportunity to
be heard are two of the most ftmdamental requirements of due
process." Arguably, without these two fundamental require-
ments, there is no "process" being afforded the inmate. The
guarantees of notice and hearing to Ohio inmates were very
important to justice O'Connor's determination of the case. She
reasoned that the "process [Woodard] received, including
notice of the hearing and an opportunity to participate
in an interview, comports with ... whatever limitations the
Due Process Clause may impose on clemency proceedings:"
It is not at all clear that she would have found Due Process sat-
isfied in the absence of notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Based on this, counsel could argue that because Virginia does
not provide these fundamental requirements of Due Process,
its clemency process violates the FourteenthAmendment.
Summary and analysis by:
Brian S. Clarke
process: Woodard, 1998WL 129931,at*10 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in
part & concurring in the judgment). SimilarlyJustice Stevens expressed
the belief that a denial of clemency which resulted from "procedures
infected by bribery, personal or political animosity, or the deliberate fab-
rication of false evidence"would be constitutionally unacceptable.Id at
*11 (Stevens,J, concurring in part & dissenting in part).
Additionally, if there was evidence that Virginia's clemency
process operated in a racially discriminatory manner, an inmate
may have an Equal Protection claim.As Justice Stevens stated in
Woodard, "no one would contend that a governor could ignore
the commands of the Equal Protection Clause and use race, reli-
gion, or political affiliation as a standard for granting or denying
clemency' Woodard, 1998WL 129931, at "12 (Stevens,J., concur-
ring in part & dissenting in part).
2See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
'Woodard, 1998WL 129931, at *11 (O'ConnorJ., concurring
in part & concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
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1997 WIL 585739 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997)'
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On the night of May 1, 1990Thomas H. Beavers,Jr. broke
into the home of a sixty year-old widow named Marguerite
Lowery. Beavers subsequently raped and murdered Ms.
Lowery by smothering her with a pillow. Beavers was con-
'This is an unpublished disposition which is referenced in the
"Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions" at 125 E3d 847
(4th Cir. 1997).
'Beavers v.Pruett, 1997WL 585739,at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 23,1997).
victed of capital murder and sentenced to death 3 based on the
"future dangerousness" aggravator.4 The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed on direct appeal and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.' Beavers then filed a state habeas peti-
3Beavers, 1997WL 585739, at *1. Beavers was also convicted
of rape, grand larceny, and arson and was sentenced to life, ten
years, and eight years respectively on those counts. Id. at *1 n.3.
'Va. Code § 19.2-264.2 (1995).
'Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 427 S.E.2d 411, cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993).
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tion which was dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. In
dismissing the petition, the circuit court reasoned that
Beavers' ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit
and his other claims were procedurally defaulted because
they were not raised on direct appeal.6 The Supreme Court
of Virginia denied review of the circuit court's dismissal.
7
Beavers then filed this action seeking a "certificate of
appealability"in the United States Court ofAppeals for the
Fourth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2253(c)(1)
(1997).8 After the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Lindh v. Murphy,9 Beavers sought a
"certificate of probable cause to appeal"" from the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia."
6Beavers v. Pruett, 1997 WL 585739, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 23,
1997) (citing Hawks v. Cox, 211 Va. 91, 95, 175 S.E.2d 271, 274
(1970) (precluding state habeas consideration of claims that were
considered on their merits during direct review, absent changed
circumstances) & Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 30, 205 S.E.2d
680,682 (1974) (holding that issues not properly raised on direct
appeal will not be considered on state habeas)).
'This step of the state habeas process has since been removed
by statute. Effective July 1, 1995,Vtrginia Code Section 8.01-654 was
amended to add subsection (c) which states, in part, that the
Supreme Court shall have "exclusive jurisdiction" to consider and
grant writs of habeas corpus to convicts sentenced to death.Virginia
Code Section 8.01-654(c), as amended, also states that the circuit
court "which entered the judgment order setting the sentence of
death shall have authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing on such
petition [for a writ of habeas corpus] only if directed to do so by
order of the Supreme Court." Thus all state habeas petitions filed
afterJuly 1, 1995,must be filed in the first instance with the Supreme
Court ofVIrginia. Beaver's state habeas petition was filed onApril 19,
1994. For a discussion of the standards of review applicable under
rrginia Code Section 8.01-654, as amended, see Case Summary of
Williams v. Warden, Cap. DefJ.,Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 30.
STitle 28 United States Code Section 2253 provides, in pertinent
part, that "[u]niess a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals
from ... the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the
detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State
court:This section of chapter 153 of Title 28 was amended by the
enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA),Pub.L.No.104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.Beavers'petition for
a writ of habeas corpus was filed on October 11, 1995.According to
the United States Supreme Court in Lindh v.Muiphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059
(1997), the amendments to chapter 153 ofTitle 28 effected byAEDPA
do not govern federal habeas petitions such as Beavers' that were
filed prior to April 24,1996, the dateAEDPA was enacted.
9117 S.Ct. 2059,2067 (1997) (concluding thatAEDPA amend-
ments to chapter 153 of Title 28 do not apply to petitions filed
prior to the effective date ofAEDPA).
"Prior toAEDPA, chapter 153 ofTitle 28 required habeas peti-
tioners to seek a certificate of probable cause to appeal from a
United States District Court. In order to warrant granting the cer-
tificate, a petitioner had to "make a substantial showing of the
denial of [a] federal right" and the issue had to have been either one
which was "debatable among jurists of reason" or that the "ques-
tions [were] adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed fur-
ther:'Lozada v.fDeeds, 498 U.S. 430,431-32 (1991).
"Beavers v. Pruett, 1997 WL 585739, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 23,
1997).
The district court denied the certificate because Beavers
had"not made a significant showing of the denial of a con-
stitutional right." 2 Additionally, the district court deter-
mined that, of the issues Beavers pressed on appeal, four
were procedurally defaulted 3 and another three were
without merit. 4
HOLDING
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's con-
clusion that Beavers was not entitled to habeas relief and
denied Beavers' application for a certificate of appealability."
"Beavers, 1997 WL 585739, at *6.
131d. at *1. Beavers' defaulted claims included: (1) ineffective
assistance of his court-appointed mental health expert; (2) the
trial court's refusal to allow one of his trial attorneys to with-
draw; (3) the trial court's refusal to remove for cause a prospec-
tive juror who stated that she would impose the death penalty if
a capital conviction was returned; and (4) the trial court's failure
to give a specific instruction on the jury's duty to consider the
mitigating evidence. Of these four claims, the court of appeals
only discussed the last one.
In holding that this claim was procedurally defaulted, the
court said that although Beavers mentioned "[tirial counsell's
failure] to request, and the trial court's failure to give" any miti-
gating instructions at the sentencing phase as part of his argu-
ment for ineffective assistance of counsel in his state habeas peti-
tion, this was insufficient to preserve the separate issue of the
trial court's failure to "adequately [guide] the discretion of the
jury in considering the mitigating evidence' Id. at *2. The court
reasoned that Beavers' original petition to the Supreme Court of
Virginia "omitted reference to any other constitutional right to
additional instruction concerning the mitigating evidence and
failed to provide any argument concerning why the referenced
instructions were constitutionally required" and thus, Beavers
failed to properly exhaust this claim. Id. at *2 n.4 (citing Duncan
v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995); Matthews v. Evatt, 105 E3d
907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997); Mallory v. Smith, 27 E3d 991,994 (4th
Cir. 1994); & George v. Angelone, 100 E3d 353, 363 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 854 (1997)).
As the court's discussion of this issue makes clear, counsel
must be very careful when drafting state habeas petitions in
order to avoid procedural defaults on federal habeas. See
Beavers, 1997 WIL 585739, at *2 & Matthews v. Evatt, 105 E3d
907,911 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that for a federal claim to be
properly exhausted, the substance of the federal claim must be
presented to the highest state court). Unfortunately, the viabili-
ty of the specific claim discussed here, failure of the trial court
to adequately instruct the jury on consideration of the mitigat-
ing evidence, was dealt a serious blow by the Supreme Court in
Buchanan v.Angelone, 1998 WL 17109, (U.S.Jan. 21, 1998). For
further discussion on this issue, see Case Summary of
Buchanan v.Angelone, Cap. Def.J., this issue.
4These claims are discussed infra.
"5Beavers, 1997 WL 585739, at *1. The United States
Supreme Court denied Beavers' petition for a writ of certiorari.
Beavers v. Pruett, 118 S.Ct. 621,66 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. 1997). On
that same day, December 11, 1997,Thomas Beavers was execut-
ed by lethal injection.
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Motion for Mistrial Denied Despite Prejudicial
Statements by a Prosecution Witness
A state law enforcement officer, Deputy Lam, testified
for the Commonwealth at Beavers' trial. On direct examina-
tion, Lam testified that Beavers told him that "'he had no
other choice but to do what he had done because [Mrs.
Lowery] could identify himY" 6 As his testimony progressed,
however, Lam "equivocated regarding the accuracy of his
memory of portions of the statement." 17 Beavers objected to
Lam's testimony and moved for a mistrial due to the overly
prejudicial nature of Lam's comments.The trial court sus-
tained the objection but denied the motion for a mistrial.
Instead, the court instructed the jury to disregard Lam's tes-
timony in its entirety. 9
Beavers asserted that the cautionary instruction given
by the trial court was, under the circumstances, insufficient
to cure the prejudice caused by Lam's statement.
Additionally, Beavers' claimed that the trial court's failure to
grant a mistrial"created an impermissible risk that [his] con-
viction and sentence were the product of passion, prejudice,
and arbitrary factors:"20 The court of appeals, without con-
sidering the merits of these claims, held that even if Beavers'
assertions were correct, relief was barred by the new rule
doctrine of Teague v. Lane.2' The court reasoned that
Beavers had"point[ed] to no clearly established rule of con-
stitutional law in existence in October 1993 ... that would
have compelled a state court to reverse his conviction:"I
The court's invocation of Teague in this situation is
troubling. Beavers' claims on this issue were essentially that
his trial was rendered unfair due to the statements of
Deputy Lam.Thus, the constitutional right Beavers asserted
was the right to a fair trial. It is well established that the
"right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the
FourteenthAmendment 2An essential element of the right
to a fair trial is the right to have "guilt [ ] established by pro-
bative evidence .. .21 It is the duty of "courts [to] carefully
guard against dilution of [this] principal" 25 by ensuring that
passion, prejudice, and other arbitrary factors play no role
in determining the guilt of an accused. This is especially
6Beavers, 1997 WL 585739, at *4 (quoting Beavers v.




"Beavers, 1997 WL 585739, at *4.
21489 U.S. 288 (1989).
'Beavers, 1997 WL 585739, at *5.
"Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). See Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (stating that the right to a fair
trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment) & Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947)
(same).
2Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970)).
251d.
true in capital murder proceedings where the United States
Supreme Court has stressed the need for "heightened []
reliability" in the outcome.
2 6
By characterizing the right Beavers asserted as the right
to have a mistrial declared whenever a witness makes state-
ments later deemed inappropriate, the court ignored the
basic premise behind Beavers' argument. Additionally, by
invoking Teague to avoid deciding Beavers' claim, the court
tacitly adopted the position that, unless there was an explic-
it and absolute rule exactly on point in existence at the time
the petitioner's conviction became final, relief will never be
appropriate in the court of appeals because of the new rule
doctrine.
H. A Variety of Lessons for Capital Defense Attorneys
A. Attempting to Avoid Procedural Defaults
The basic requirement for avoiding the procedural
default of a claim is that the petitioner must show either
"that cause and prejudice exist to excuse the default or that
failure to consider the claim would amount to a miscarriage
of justice:' The petitioner, however, must argue that these
elements exist, otherwise they will not be considered by a
reviewing court."
Beavers did not argue that cause and prejudice existed to
excuse the default."9 Instead, Beavers only argued that failure
to consider the claims which the district court held were
defaulted would result in a miscarriage of justice."0 Beavers
premised this claim on the fact that "his organic brain disorder
and brain tumor demonstrate his actual innocence: 3' The
court, however, reasoned that it was "undisputed ... that
Beavers actually murdered Lowery" and that his additional evi-
dence did not demonstrate that he was not criminally respon-
sible for his actions. 2 Further, the court reasoned that Beavers
had failed to carry his burden of showing that "no reasonable
juror would have found [him] eligible for the death penalty"
based on the evidence of his brain disorder.33
Defense counsel should, if at all possible, avoid limiting
their arguments to only one of the two paths available to
avoid procedural defaults. If there is a good faith basis for
doing so, counsel should make every effort to show both
cause and prejudice and a miscarriage of justice in either
the guilt determination or the sentence.While each of these
theories is increasingly difficult to establish in Virginia,
counsel should not abandon their efforts to do so.
'Chambers v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
'Beavers, 1997 WL 585739, at *2 (citing Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,750 (1991)).
"Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,298 (1989).
"Beavers, 1997WL 585739, at *2.
"Id. When making a claim such as this, the burden of persua-
sion is on the petitioner. Further, the standard of proof is "clear and




33Beavers, 1997 WL 585739, at *2.
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B. Requesting Expert Examinations
During his life, Beavers suffered from both an organic brain
disorder and a brain tumor.- In order to explore whether or not
these conditions affected Beavers' mental health, Beavers' trial
counsel requested that Beavers be examined by a mental health
expert3 The court granted this request and appointed Dr.
Henry 0. Gwaltney, Jr. to examine Beavers., Apparently, Dr.
Gwaltney was not infrequently involved in the examination of
capital murder defendants either as court-appointed psycholo-
gist or as an expert witness for the Commonwealth.3 7 Dr.
Gwaltney's examination and subsequent report, however, pro-
vided Beavers with"little support for an insanity defense or evi-
dence in mitigation!' s In order to avoid such a result, Beavers'
trial counsel could have found an independent mental health
expert and requested either the funds necessary to retain that
person or appointment of that person by the court.
Experts appointed by the court pursuant to an Ake39
request are required to "assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense! 4 In order for this to be done effec-
tively, trial counsel should request independent experts and not
acquiesce in the court's appointment of a doctor who fre-
quently testifies on behalf of the Commonwealth and may or
may not be interested in developing useful mitigation evidence.
C. Presenting the Case in Mitigation
It is not clear exactly what sort of mitigating evidence was
presented at Beavers' trial. According to the court of appeals,
"Beavers' trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation for
reasonable mitigating evidence with Beavers' closest family
members and found nothing that, in the professional judgment
of the attorneys, could be employed in Beaver's defense' 41 Yet,
the court insinuates that no mitigating evidence was actually
presented at trial.The court did not question the determination
of Beavers' trial counsel that the testimony of either Dr
Gwaltney, regarding Beavers' mental health, or of Beavers' family
would have been "more damaging than beneficial 42Thus, accord-
ing to the court, trial counsel's strategic decision to present little,




37There are two other reported cases in which Dr. Gwaltney
was involved. In one of these cases, Gwaltney was the
Commonwealth's expert witness during the sentencing phase.
Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386,414,422 S.E.2d 380, 397
(1992).In the otheras was done in Beavers, Gwaltney was appoint-
ed by the court to examine the defendant prior to trial.Jones v.
Murray, 947 E2d 1106, 1112-1113 n.4 (4th Cir. 1991). In both
Mueller and Jones, the defendants were sentenced to death.
-"Beavers, 1997WL 585739, at *3.
"9Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that when a
defendant's mental condition is a significant factor in a criminal
proceeding, the defendant is entitled to the appointment of a psy-
chological expert to assist in the defense).
'OAke, 470 U.S. at 83.
"Beavers, 1997 WL 585739, at *4.
While it is true that some mitigating evidence may be
misinterpreted as aggravating by the jury, it is impossible to
say that this will happen in a given situation." As a general
rule, it is usually better to present all available evidence in
mitigation and allow the jury to draw their own conclu-
sions . 5 As one circuit judge put it, "at a capital murder sen-
tencing, any evidence which might be favorable or mitigat-
ing can mean the difference between 'life or death" 46
D. Questioning the Jury During Voir Dire
During jury voir dire, Beavers' trial counsel requested that
the trial court ask prospective jurors the following question:
"Do you believe that if one is convicted of taking another's life,
the proper penalty is loss of your own life?"47 The trial court
declined to ask this question and instead asked the following
question: "If the jury should convict the defendant of capital
murder, would you be able to consider voting for a sentence
less than death?"" The court of appeals held that the latter
question was sufficient to "identify [potential jurors] who
would automatically vote for the death penalty.
"49
It is very important for jurors to be asked searching ques-
tions on voir dire.As such, defense counsel should have a vari-
ety of proposed questions to present to the court.These ques-
tions should include various wordings which give the trial
court several options which, while not as searching as defense
counsel may like, are much more searching than the question
ultimately asked by the trial court in Beavers.5
Summary and analysis by
Brian S. Clarke
42Id. at "3.431d. at *4.
"In fact, the court of appeals pointed out that "evidence of a
defendant's mental impairment" may both "diminish his blamewor-
thiness" and"indicate[ ] that there is a probability that he will be dan-
gerous in the future' Id. at *4 (quoting Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d
971,980-81 (4th Cir. 1995).Thus, the court concluded,"this evidence
is a two-edged sword" and the"sentencing authority could well have
found in the mitigating evidence of mental illness or history of abuse,
sufficient evidence to support a finding of future dangerousness:'Id
at *4 (quoting Barnes, 58 E3d at 981).There is, of course, no guaran-
tee that the jury will interpret the evidence in this way.
"Clearly, however, there are certain situations in which pre-
senting a particular piece of evidence which is, technically speak-
ing, "mitigating," would not actually mitigate the offense and thus
should not be presented. As such, counsel should exercise their
discretion in this area with the utmost thought and care.
"Williams v.Warden, 254 Va. 16,22,487 S.E.2d 194, 197 (1997)
(emphasis original). Further, the burden of proof on the issue of future
dangerousness is on ,the Commonwealth. Va. Code § 19.2-264.2
(1995).Thus, the Commonwealth is required to present evidence to
support this finding beyond a reasonable doubt without assistance
from any evidence presented by the defendant in mitigation.
4"Beavers, 1997 WL 585739, at *5.
48Id.
49d.
5For ideas on this issue, see, The Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse Trial Manual.
